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Abstract. Efforts have been made to improve the security of the Inter-
net of Things (IoT) devices, but there remain some vulnerabilities and
misimplementations. This paper describes a new threat to home security
devices in which an attacker can disable all functionality of a device,
but to the device’s owner, everything still appears to be operational. We
targeted home security devices because their security is critical as peo-
ple may rely on them to protect their homes. In particular, we exploited
a feature called “heartbeat”, which is exchanged between the devices
and the cloud in order to check that the devices are still connected.
Even though network traffic was encrypted, we successfully identified
the heartbeats due to their fixed size and periodic nature. Thereafter,
we established a man-in-the-middle attack between the device and the
cloud and selectively forwarded heartbeats while filtering out other traf-
fic. As a result, the device appears to be still connected (because the
heartbeat traffic is being allowed through), while in reality the device’s
functionality is disabled (because non-heartbeat traffic is being filtered
out). We applied this exploit on a set of six devices, and five were found
to be vulnerable. Consequently, an intruder can use this exploit to dis-
able a home security device and break into a house without the awareness
of the owner. We carried out a responsible disclosure exercise with the
manufacturers of the affected devices, but the response has been limited.
This shows that IoT security is still not taken completely seriously and
many threats are still undiscovered. Finally, we provide some recommen-
dations on how to detect and prevent the threats posed by insecure IoT
devices, which ironically include IoT home security kits.
Keywords: IoT · Security · Attack · Off-the-shelf Devices · Heartbeats
· Selective Forwarding · SSL/TLS · WPA2.
1 Introduction
The Internet has considerably changed in the last decade. It has become more
than just a platform for email exchanges, web browsing, instant messaging or
media streaming. The connected devices are no longer just servers, computers
and smartphones, but instead the Internet has become an Internet of Things
(IoT), of connected wearables, home appliances, biomedical devices, cars, cities,
and many more. IoT is gaining more and more popularity and experts predict
that it will become an Internet of Everything in the near future [1]. It is estimated
that the number of connected devices will reach up to 20 billion by 2020 [2].
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Despite its convenience, IoT and its applications introduce major privacy
threats and critical security risks. For instance, IoT devices may be compromised
to access personal information, or to gain control over industries, cities and public
organisations or disrupt their services. This has been shown by several incidents
like the Mirai botnet [3,4]. Mirai is a computer worm that compromised hundreds
of thousands of IoT devices, which were then used to mount a Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack to disrupt well-known services like Netflix and Twitter
[5]. IoT also imposes personal privacy threats through smart home devices like
cameras, personal assistants and home automation kits. For example, Trendnet
home security and monitoring cameras were found to be vulnerable, allowing an
attacker to access live video feeds of the camera without any authentication [6].
Likewise, customers of Swann home cameras reported that they were able to
access recordings from cameras of other customers [7]. A very recent report of
security vulnerabilities in three specialist car alarm systems further illustrates
the danger of connecting your device to the Internet without proper security
testing [8]. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to steal or hijack affected
vehicles through the compromised alarm system. What is ironic here is that
whoever bought these vulnerable car alarm systems did so out of a desire to
improve the security of their vehicle. But inadvertently, they introduced security
vulnerabilities that would allow attackers to take control of their vehicle. This
irony resonates with the message we aim to convey in our paper.
Evidently, the security of IoT devices is a major issue that needs to be con-
tinuously evaluated and addressed due to its impact on the physical world. This
motivated us to explore new and common vulnerabilities in a selected set of
consumer IoT products. Particularly, we targeted home security devices because
their security is critical as people may rely on them to protect their homes.
Contribution. The main contribution of this paper is the exploitation of a
vulnerability in the heartbeat exchange of IoT devices. By exploiting this vulner-
ability, an attacker can disable IoT home security devices without the awareness
of their owners. Particularly, the device will appear to be online and working
normally, but in fact it will be completely disabled. This was due to wrong im-
plementations of heartbeat messages exchanged between devices and their cloud
infrastructure. Our second contribution relates to a potential misimplementation
of the WPA2 four-way handshake protocol in some IoT devices. This misimple-
mentation allows an attacker to carry out an evil twin access point attack, which
would force the device to connect to the attacker’s LAN. This would allow the
attacker to exploit further vulnerabilities, or eavesdrop on the communications
between the device and the cloud.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents related work.
Section 3 outlines our methodology, while Section 4 presents our findings and
results. Section 5 describes the threat model to illustrate the feasibility of our
attack. Section 6 dissects the risks and consequences of the discovered vulnerabil-
ity. We present some insights from the responsible disclosure exercise we carried
out with the affected manufacturers of the devices. We also propose some recom-
mendations to how to fix the vulnerabilities uncovered by our research. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper and provides ideas for future work.
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2 Related Work
Visan et al. [9] assessed the security of Samsung Smart Things hub. They first
attempted to extract credentials from the hub using various traffic sniffing meth-
ods. They also demonstrated that the hub is robust and secure. However, they
discovered that a DoS attack against the hub is possible, if the attacker has
access to the LAN. The attack would give an intruder an 8-minute window to
break into a house before notifying the owner. Visan et al. argue that home
security kits are not completely reliable.
Another good example is the work by Fernandes et al. [10], which demon-
strated again that despite the effort put into security, there may remain some
security issues due to the complex nature of the products. More precisely, they
discovered vulnerabilities inside the architecture, in the capability model and the
event subsystem of Samsung Smart Things, due to the numerous and complex
functionalities exposed to the user. By exploiting them, they managed to insert
backdoor pin-codes into a connected door lock, eavesdrop door lock pin-codes,
cause a fake fire alarm and disable the vacation mode of the device. More im-
portantly, those vulnerabilities were significant as they targeted the architecture
of the application layer at its core, thus making them difficult to patch.
Apthrope et al. [11] proved that users’ privacy can be breached without
compromising devices or network communications. They showed that any party
having network access – e.g. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) – can infer sen-
sitive information just by analysing network traffic. They particularly analysed
DNS requests, IP and TCP headers and packet rates to identify device types and
user interaction. For instance, they were able to determine if a user is sleeping
by analysing a sleep sensor’s traffic, or if the user is moving inside a house by
analysing a motion sensor’s traffic. This work highlights that privacy is a critical
challenge in IoT security, and it cannot be achieved with cryptography only.
Jerry Gamblin discovered that Google home assistant can be controlled by
any device that has network access to the LAN. The device can send commands
to the assistant without any authentication and it can cause to reboot and even
to disconnect from Wi-Fi. This is due to an undocumented API that can be
exploited by sending rogue commands [12].
Very recently, OConnor et al. [13] uncovered a design flaw in the messaging
protocols of 22 IoT devices. The design flaw they uncovered is very similar to the
weakness we discuss in this paper. We independently carried out our research
and developed a proof-of-concept automated tool to exploit this flaw.
3 Methodology
We chose smart home IoT devices because they provide a wider attack sur-
face due to their numerous interconnected components such as cameras, alarms,
motion detectors and many other sensors. We targeted a set of home security
devices including Swann Smart Home Security Kit (SWO-HUB01K), D-Link
Home Security Kit (DCH-G020), D-Link camera (DCS-935L), Panasonic Home
Monitoring and Control Kit (KX-HN6012EW), Telldus Smart Home Start-up
Kit and Samsung SmartThings (F-H-ETH-001). We performed DoS attacks on
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the selected devices, mainly Wi-Fi deauthentication and blackhole attacks. We
used arpspoof tool [14] for a blackhole attack and aireplay-ng tool [15] for
Wi-Fi deauthentication attack. arpspoof tool was used to achieve a MITM po-
sition and IP forwarding was disabled to complete the blackhole attack. More-
over, we analysed network traffic thoroughly to find patterns that were then
used in our selective forwarding attack. Traffic analysis was mainly conducted
using Wireshark [16], in which several Wireshark filters were used to analyse
and identify patterns in network traffic of each device. In addition, our selective
forwarding attack requires achieving a MITM position on the Transport layer.
Thus, it was necessary to run a TCP proxy and force the devices to connect
to the proxy instead of connecting to their legitimate servers. DNS poisoning
was the best option to force the devices to connect to the proxy. For that, we
used Wireshark to view DNS requests and responses, and identify the domain
names and the IP addresses of the servers. Then, we used Bind9 and configured
it to resolve the identified DNS requests to the IP address of the machine that
is running the proxy. As a result, all devices connected to the proxy instead of
connecting to their servers. The proxy was developed as a Python script, and it
can be found with the Bind9 configurations on GitHub1.
4 Results
We conducted blackhole and Wi-Fi de-authentication attacks on the selected
devices to determine the required time to alert or display that the device went
offline. The results showed that the devices took between 5 seconds and 2 minutes
to alert the user depending on the vendor. Thereupon, we deduced that the
devices must be exchanging periodic messages with the cloud to prove that they
are still online. Once the cloud stops receiving those messages, it reports to the
user application that the device was disconnected. Those messages are known as
heartbeats and they are defined as “a periodic signal generated by hardware or
software to indicate that it is still running” [17].
We realised that heartbeats will always have a fixed size during one session
because the payload is always the same and it is always encrypted with the same
algorithm over this session. Subsequently, we postulated that heartbeat messages
can be identified in network traffic even if they were encrypted due to their
periodic nature and constant payload size. Therefore, we presumed that we can
exploit this pattern by selectively forwarding heartbeats and TLS handshakes,
and blocking any other traffic. This will deceive the server into believing that the
device is still online and sending heartbeats, when in fact its traffic is blocked.
We designated this attack as the “heartbeat attack”.
4.1 Heartbeats in Swann
We noticed that every 10 seconds, the hub sends 92 bytes of data and the server
responds with 425 bytes of payload as shown in Figure 1. Subsequently, we wrote
a Python script that opens two TCP streams with the hub and the server, and
selectively forwards data between them. The proxy initially forwards all data
for few seconds to ensure that the TLS handshake was completed, then it only
1 https://github.com/HaririAli/IoTHeartbeatProxy.git
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forwards 92-byte and 425-byte long data. Thus, the proxy will only forward
heartbeats and block any other traffic.
Fig. 1. Wireshark capture of heartbeats in Swann’s traffic
4.2 Heartbeats in D-Link Hub
Similarly, we analysed network traffic from D-Link hub looking for a periodic
pattern. However, we did not find any periodic data packets exchanged between
the server and the hub. We rather found that the server sends TCP keepalive
packets every 5 seconds and the hub responds with a TCP keepalive ACK. Thus,
D-Link relied on TCP keepalive packets to ensure that the hub is still online and
connected. This, in fact, makes the exploit much simpler as the proxy does not
have to forward any data but rather just acknowledge TCP keepalive packets
once the connection is established. Thereupon, we edited the Python proxy to
forward the TLS handshake and then terminate the TCP connection with the
hub. Consequently, the proxy will establish a connection with the server because
the TLS handshake was completed. The proxy will then acknowledge any traffic
coming from the server including TCP keepalive packets. The behaviour of this
exploit is illustrated in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Behaviour of heartbeat exploit against D-Link hub
4.3 Heartbeats in D-Link Camera
We also analysed D-Link camera’s traffic and observed that it sends a 314-byte
long heartbeat every 55 seconds and the server responds with two heartbeats
of 90 and 218 bytes of data. This pattern is shown in Figure 3. Thereupon, we
edited our Python script to selectively forward those 3 heartbeat messages and
block everything else.
Fig. 3. Wireshark capture of heartbeats in D-Link camera’s traffic
4.4 Heartbeats in Panasonic
We discovered that the heartbeats are sent as 48-byte long UDP datagrams every
15 seconds. Since the heartbeats are sent as UDP datagrams, there was no need
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to run a TCP proxy and selective forwarding could be achieved using iptables
only. Subsequently, we wrote iptables rules to allow only 48-byte long UDP
packets and drop everything else. However, this exploit was only tested when
both the hub and the smartphone are on the same LAN. Testing the exploit
on WAN was not possible due to unknown technical issues in which the mobile
application was not able to access the hub. The exploit succeeded on the LAN
and the application displayed that the hub is online. However, the application
was completely unresponsive because it could not receive anything apart from
heartbeats.
4.5 Heartbeats in Telldus
Telldus TellStick was found to send its traffic in cleartext. Thus, it is possible
to capture heartbeats and replay them with a custom HTTP client. This will
display that the device is online without any selective forwarding and without
even connecting it at all. To validate our assumption, we analysed traffic from
Telldus to identify the cleartext heartbeat. Subsequently, we wrote a Python
script that connects to the server and sends the same payload every two minutes.
4.6 Heartbeats in Samsung SmartThings
Visan et al. [9] proved that under a DoS attack, Samsung Smartthings provides
a time-window of 8 minutes before notifying the user. To build on their work,
we decided to apply the heartbeat exploit on the same device to check if it can
provide an infinite time window. We analysed network traffic collected from the
hub and noticed that both the server and the hub exchange heartbeats every 31
seconds; the hub sends 49 bytes and the server responds with 55 bytes of data.
Unlike the other devices, Samsung SmartThings proved that its heartbeat ex-
change is robust and secure. The hub disconnected immediately upon selectively
forwarding its heartbeats. Subsequently, we analysed the behaviour of the de-
vice to understand how it detected the exploit. We discovered that upon blocking
non-heartbeat messages, either the device or the server disconnects right after
the next heartbeat. This means that the server was reporting in its heartbeat
whether it received the last message or not. This allowed the device to detect
that the last message was not received by the server, thus it disconnected. As
such, we think that the heartbeat messages in this system have some sort of
checking whether other (non-heartbeat) messages have passed through or not.
4.7 Summary
The sizes, types and periods of heartbeats of each device are summarised in
Table 1. During the experiment, we developed custom proxies for each device
and used them to conduct selective forwarding exploits. Once we confirmed our
results, we developed a generic selective forwarding proxy (outlined in Section
3) that takes a set of arguments to customise its behaviour.
The results of this exploit proved that the devices can be completely dis-
abled while their corresponding applications still display them as online and
operational. This exploit can be considered as an unnoticed DoS attack, because
the system was not really available, but the application displayed that it was
normally working. The results of the heartbeat exploit are summarised in Table
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Table 1. Summary of heartbeat patterns in the analysed devices
Device Heartbeat Type Size of Server Heartbeat (bytes) Size of device heartbeat (bytes) Period (seconds)
Swann TCP payload 425 92 10
D-Link TCP keepalive N/A N/A 5
D-Link Camera TCP payload 90; 218 314 55
Panasonic UDP datagram 20 20 15
Telldus TCP payload ”Ping” (cleartext message) ”Pong” (cleartext message) 120
Samsung TCP payload 55 49 31
2, where the third column states if the device can be physically disconnected
during the attack (which indicates a more severe security violation), and the
last column presents relevant further details for each device.






Swann Succeeded Yes Swann has 2 heartbeats implemented on the Application layer.
But the server is not checking for the one coming from the device.
D-Link Succeeded Yes D-Link implements heartbeat on the Transport layer with TCP
keepalives sent every 5 seconds.
D-Link
Camera
Succeeded No D-Link camera employs three heartbeats on the Application
layer. The camera sends a heartbeat and the server responds
with two heartbeats.
Panasonic Succeeded No On the LAN, both the hub and the mobile app are exchanging
heartbeat messages every 15 seconds encapsulated in UDP.





Failed No The hub sends heartbeat messages every 31 seconds and the
server responds. But it detects our attempt to attack the heart-
beat, and on the next heartbeat, the server closes the connection.
5 Threat Model
In this section, we demonstrate how an attacker can theoretically and practi-
cally exploit the vulnerability in the heartbeat exchange. We then describe an
automated attack that we have successfully applied to one of the devices.
5.1 Wi-Fi attacks
The easiest way for an attacker to exploit heartbeats is by gaining access to the
LAN to which the device is connected. This is relatively straightforward for an
attacker to achieve, as many users still use broken protocols like WEP and WPA;
many do not even use Wi-Fi encryption at all. According to Wigle, around 4%
of access points are unencrypted, 6.3% use WEP and 5.8% use WPA [18]. An
attacker can also compromise Wi-Fi networks protected by WPA2 using dictio-
nary attacks like the attack demonstrated in [19]. An attacker can compromise
a Wi-Fi AP by exploiting the vulnerability of Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)
protocol, which allows association to an AP using an 8-digit PIN. [20].
5.2 DNS Server Hijacking
An attacker can hijack a DNS server and change the records directly. This may
be a primary DNS server of the IoT device’s vendor or a resolver or cache server
of an ISP. In all cases the attacker would be able to exploit the vulnerability
in a large group of devices that are served by the compromised DNS server.
This attack is infeasible in most situations, but it is still possible and there
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are several real-world examples, such as the DNSpionage attack, which targeted
governmental and private organisations in Lebanon and the UAE. The attackers
redirected email and VPN traffic to an IP address managed by them [21]. Sim-
ilarly, attackers can redirect heartbeat traffic to a TCP proxy using this attack
and eventually exploit the vulnerability in the heartbeat exchange.
5.3 Network Attacks
Theoretically, an attacker can gain access to one or more routers of an ISP by
exploiting a vulnerability in the router’s operating system. Subsequently, the
attacker can use the compromised router to spoof DNS responses or to filter out
traffic. This indeed is practically almost infeasible as it is very difficult to gain
access to ISP’s network devices. Nonetheless, there are some real-world examples
that prove this kind of attacks possible in specific situations. For instance, in
2015, FireEye discovered that a group of attackers did manage to take over
Cisco routers. [22] Similarly, Cisco has recently discovered and patched serious
security holes that allow root access in their SD-WAN software [23]. This proves
that such attacks although very difficult, are still possible and can allow attackers
to eventually exploit the heartbeat vulnerability against not only one but a large
group of devices.
5.4 Automated Attack against Swann using Evil-Twin Wi-Fi AP
For devices that support Wi-Fi connections, attackers can try Evil Twin attacks
to force a device to connect to their own LAN on which they can spoof DNS
records. We experimented this attack on the Swann hub and successfully man-
aged to force it to connect to our LAN and eventually exploited its heartbeats.
In WPA2, a four-way handshake needs to be completed before sending any data,
but the handshake cannot be completed because the evil twin does not know
the password. Surprisingly, Swann hub connected to the rogue AP anyway and
sent DHCP, DNS and TCP traffic normally. After exchanging few packets, the
hub then fell back to association request/responses and kept repeating the same
behaviour in a loop. An illustration of this behavior is shown in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Combination of the WPA2 and Heartbeat vulnerabilities in Swann.
The IEEE802.11i standard [24] states that an AP and a Station (STA) must
exchange four EAPoL messages to complete the 4-way handshake for authen-
tication before sending any data. Based on the IEEE802.11i standard we de-
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duced that this is a misimplementation of the standard in the driver of the de-
vices’ wireless chipset. By analysing Swann hub’s hardware, we discovered that
it uses a Jorjin WG7831-D0 Wi-Fi chipset. According to its documentation, the
chipset is based on the Texas Instruments WL1831MOD chipset and WiLink8
driver [25,26].
By exploiting this misimplementation, we managed to achieve a MITM be-
tween the hub and the server, and perform the heartbeat attack. The attack was
then automated using bash and the Python proxy script. The whole process can
be found on GitHub2. Consequently, our exploit can disable any Swann device
located nearby our attacking machine, without its owner’s awareness.
6 Discussion
Exploiting the heartbeat pattern is not critical in all IoT applications like light
bulbs for example. However, it can be remarkably critical in home security kits
and in some health care applications which are used to remotely monitor pa-
tients. Furthermore, this attack can be extended to identify other patterns in
encrypted traffic like sensor readings or controller commands and selectively for-
ward and drop those patterns. For instance, attackers can block some control
commands in water distribution systems to cause floods, or in electricity distri-
bution systems to cause blackouts. Autonomous vehicles can also be affected by
this attack in which attackers filter communications between the vehicles lead-
ing to deadly accidents. Therefore, detection and defence mechanisms must be
studied and developed to prevent such attacks and to reach a more secure IoT.
To exploit heartbeats, an attacker must redirect network traffic to a malicious
proxy. Nevertheless, attackers can find many ways to gain access over the net-
work. This was proven by Chapman [27] who compromised WLAN credentials
by exploiting a vulnerability in LIFX light bulbs. Alternatively, attackers can
compromise Wi-Fi credentials using social engineering techniques. Therefore, it
is necessary to secure the heartbeat exchange in IoT, even though its exploit
requires network access.
6.1 Recommendations and Countermeasures
Some ”secure” implementations of the heartbeat pattern were proposed by dif-
ferent authors. For instance, IBM proposes an implementation that uses fresh-
ness and challenge-response mechanisms and provides security against spoofing
and replay attacks [28]. However, this solution is not secure against our attack,
because the proxy can simply detect the challenge-response pattern due to its
periodic nature and selectively forward it, while blocking any other traffic. For
that, we propose some recommendations and countermeasures that can make
heartbeat exchanges more secure in IoT. Firstly, heartbeats must always be
implemented on the application layer instead of the transport layer like TCP
keepalive packets. Secondly, heartbeats must include information about the last
message that was sent before the heartbeat. This would allow both endpoints to
detect if any messages were filtered out. To understand this mechanism better,
consider this scenario:
2 https://github.com/SRJanel/SWO exploit
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– Device sends an encrypted heartbeat. It contains a sequence number of the
last message sent, which was a heartbeat too.
– Server confirms that the previous message was indeed a heartbeat.
– Device sends an alert that also contains previous message’s sequence number.
– Attacker selectively blocks the alert.
– Device sends a heartbeat message that contains a sequence number of the
alert that was blocked.
– Server understands that the alert was not delivered due to the missing se-
quence number.
– Finally, server notifies the user that alerts are being filtered out.
A prevention mechanism would be to always pass the last message within
the heartbeat. This would allow the server to receive the blocked message and
detect the attack because it did not receive the message as a stand-alone. Another
prevention would be using IPSec as it prevents redirecting traffic to a proxy.
The proposed countermeasure will affect the efficiency of the IoT system
especially if the devices have limited resources. This is due to the additional
metadata the must be sent in heartbeats or the overhead introduced by IPSec.
However, security usually comes at the cost of performance.
6.2 Responsible Disclosure Exercise
We contacted most of the manufacturers of the affected devices. Furthermore, we
conducted more in-depth conversation with Swann since its device has another
serious flaw. We also contacted Texas Instruments, which manufactured the Wi-
Fi chipset used by the Swann device under our investigation.
D-Link confirmed our findings but decided that the occurrence of such attack
is uncommon and eventually lowered the development priority of a patch. Swann
also confirmed our findings and reported that they will release a security patch for
their products. Panasonic stated that the discovered pattern is not a heartbeat,
but rather a mechanism to establish a peer-to-peer connection between the device
and the mobile application. Thus, they think that there is no need to release a
patch. Texas Instruments tried to reproduce our WPA2 results in Swann. They
tested several versions of their driver and all proved to be secure. They also sent
us an evaluation module to test it ourselves and we do confirm their results.
After thorough investigations by Swann, they confirmed that the module was
installed by a company that went out of operation, so although the root cause
has not been found, the vulnerability most likely stems from the specific WPA
supplicant and software used in the product. This means that the company that
installed the module is probably responsible for the poor implementation
7 Conclusion
Although the security of IoT devices has substantially improved in the past few
years, some vulnerabilities remain undiscovered in many IoT systems. Our paper
describes a new threat to home security devices in which an attacker can disable
a device while making it appear to be working normally to the user.
We demonstrated that heartbeats can be identified in network traffic even if
they were encrypted. Subsequently, we proved that heartbeats can be exploited
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using selective forwarding attack. In particular, we redirected network traffic
from the devices to a TCP proxy that only forwards heartbeats between the hub
and the server and discards any other data. As a result, the user application
displays that the device is online because heartbeats are passed. However, the
device is in fact disabled because the rest of its traffic was blocked. This allows
an intruder to disable home security devices and break into houses without the
awareness of their owners.
We applied this exploit on a set of home security devices and most of them
were found to be affected by this vulnerability. We disclosed our findings to the
affected companies to fix the issue and release the necessary patches. To mitigate
this vulnerability, we propose some recommendations to implement a robust
and secure heartbeat exchange. Our results confirm the findings of OConnor et
al. [13], although our research was carried out independently and on a different
set of devices.
Our work proves that further research is still needed for a more secure IoT. In
addition, researchers should work closely with industry to ensure that security
standards are implemented correctly. To build on this work, selective forwarding
exploits should be extended to cover any type of traffic patterns rather than just
heartbeats. This would help researchers to develop robust frameworks that can
prevent or at least detect any type of selective forwarding.
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